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JUSTICE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, AND THE
TRANSPLANT CLINICIAN: THE ETHICAL
AND LEGISLATIVE BASIS OF A NATIONAL
POLICY ON DONOR LIVER ALLOCATION
Neal R. Barshes,* Carl S. Hacker,** Richard B. Freeman Jr.,** John M.
Vierling, ****& John A. Goss*****
INTRODUCTION
Like many other valuable health care resources, the supply of donor
livers in the United States is inadequate for the number of patients
with end-stage liver disease in need of a liver transplant. The supply-
demand imbalance is most clearly demonstrated by the fact that each
year approximately ten to twelve percent of liver transplant candidates
die before a liver graft becomes available.1 When such an imbalance
between the need for a given health care resource and the supply of
that resource exists, some means of distributing the resource must be
developed.
As the technique of liver transplantation has evolved over the past
forty years, so too has the process by which donor livers are allocated.
From its beginnings as an informal, ad hoc process, liver graft
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Organ Procurement and Transplantation: Assessing Current Policies and the
Potential Impact of the DHHS Final Rule 2 (1999), available at,
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?recordid=9628#toc.
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allocation has since evolved into a formal and somewhat complicated
health care policy. This evolution has involved, at various times,
discussions between the general public, ethicists, federal legislators,
administrative organizations, transplant recipients and transplant
clinicians. With the involvement of so many stakeholders, it is
increasingly difficult (yet increasingly important) for the transplant
clinician to understand the origin of the current U.S. donor liver
allocation policy and the process by which such healthcare policies are
created. A better understanding of the ethical and legislative
foundation of the current policy will prepare the transplant clinician,
already well-prepared with a medical and social perspective on organ
allocation, as well as those in the public health and legal fields to better
contribute to the creation of future allocation policies.
This article first presents an ethical framework for the distribution of
donor livers, as this in large part guides the development of policy and
legislation. Next, the chronological development of donor liver
allocation policies is presented; like many health policies, the
development of donor liver allocation policies begins with a series of
perceived problems followed by subsequent legislative or policy
responses to these problems. This history provides background
information essential to understanding the policymaking processes that
have produced the current U.S. policies as well as the stakeholders and
issues involved in developing these policies. Intermingled with this
history are explanations of legislative and policymaking matters aimed
at helping clinicians understand the often-confusing and seemingly-
foreign processes of health policy. Although this article focuses
exclusively on donor liver allocation policy in the U.S., the ethical,
legislative, and policy issues raised are relevant to many other public
health and medical problems.
An Ethical Framework for Distributing Donor Livers
Ethical principles provide a conceptual framework for all donor liver
allocation policies that strive to be fair and morally correct. In the
context of donor liver allocation, much of the focus has been on
distributive justice, or how scarce resources are distributed to members
of a society, and in particular on the concepts of urgency and equity.
Also important, however, is the procedural justice of an allocation
policy: whether the distribution procedures are, as implemented, fair
and accurately reflect what the policies intended. Thus discussion of
liver allocation policies should begin with an introduction to these key
ethical concepts.
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Distributive Justice
Distributive justice refers to the ethical issues surrounding the
distribution of resources among members of a society; this includes
decisions regarding the type(s) of resources and quantities to be
distributed as well as who should receive the resource(s).2 Obviously,
distributive justice is relevant to medical and non-medical values or
resources, but only when the supply of the resource does not meet
demand. The potential means of allocating scarce health care
resources are many and may include allocation based on need,
likelihood of benefit, compliance with medical treatments, ability to
pay, social worth, random selection (i.e. lottery), or on a "first come,
first serve" basis.
In 1988 the United Network for Organ Sharing Ethics Committee, a
committee composed of physicians, nurses, clergy, ethicists, lawyers
and others, was convened "for the general purpose of considering
ethical issues related to the process of organ procurement, distribution
and transplantation".4 Using the 1979 Belmont Report as a starting
point,5 the committee discussed three key ethical concepts for organ
allocation: autonomy, equity, and utility.' Patient autonomy allows
candidates to decline a particular organ at any time. Moreover, equity
(or justice) describes the idea that organ allocation policies should
have "fairness in distribution of the benefits and burdens of an organ
procurement and allocation program., 7  In other words, the
distribution of resources should be based on need. In the context of
liver transplantation, need has since been determined almost
2. See Robert P. Rhodes, Health Care Politics, Policy, and Distributive
Justice 42, 57, 98-120 (1992).
3. See Ingrid Kinkopf-Zajac, Note, Assessing Patient Compliance in the
Selection of Organ Transplant Recipients, 6 HEALTH MATRIX 503, 521-22, 530-31
(1996).
4. James F. Burdick et al., Foreword: Principles of Organ and Tissue
Allocation and Donation by Living Donors, 24 TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 2226,
2226 (1992).
5. See Nat'l Comm'n for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and
Behavioral Research, The Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for
the Protection of Human Subjects of Research (1979), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK
IN BIOETHICs 22 (Albert R. Jonsen et al, eds., Georgetown Univ. Press 1998).
6. See General Principles for Allocating Human Organs and Tissues, 24
TRANSPLANT PROC. 2227, 2227 (1992) [hereinafter General Principles].
7. Id. at 2228.
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exclusively by medical urgency or likelihood of death if liver
transplantation is not performed. 8
Utility (or efficiency) describes the idea that "an action or practice
tends to be right if it results in as much or more aggregate good than
any alternative action or practice. ' '9 This concept includes possible
obvious medical and social benefits as well as potential harm to the
patient after surgery.'0 The primary benefit in the setting of liver
transplantation is the prolongation of patient survival. Recently,
disease progression has also been discussed as a benefit in situations or
disease processes in which patient survival alone does not accurately
reflect utility.1 An improvement in quality-of-life is, in general, also a
worthy goal to pursue but its importance is secondary to survival. 2
Post-transplant quality-of-life improves significantly in almost all liver
transplant recipients, and the magnitude of improvement is not
strongly correlated with pre-transplant severity of illness 3 This
occurrence limits the usefulness of post-transplant quality-of-life as a
measure of the benefit of liver transplantation. Nonetheless, when
creating allocation policies it is valid to consider other non-survival
outcomes or factors that influence survival such as blood group, panel
reactive antibody results, history of previous transplant, and candidate
14
age.
An allocation process which gives priority to urgency over utility is
at least reasonable in the context of liver transplantation in the United
8. Id. at 2230.
9. Id. at 2227.
10. See id. at 2227.
11. Richard B. Freeman, Jr. et al, Model for End-Stage Liver Disease (MELD)
Exception Guidelines: Results and Recommendations from the MELD Exception
Study Group and Conference (MESSAGE) for the Approval of Patients Who Need
Liver Transplantation with Diseases Not Considered by the Standard MELD
Formula, 12 LIVER TRANSPLANTATION S128, S128 (2006), available at
http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/abstract/113479106/ABSTRACT (must
register to purchase article).
12. Richard B. Freeman, M.D., Tufts-New England Med. Ctr., Lecture at the
2005 Texas Transplant Society Annual Meeting: Disease Severity Indices and
Policy Development: Who Should Come First Anyway? (July 14, 2005)
[hereinafter Freeman Lecture].
13. See C. Wright Pinson et al, Health-Related Quality of Life After Different
Types of Solid Organ Transplantation, 232 ANNALS OF SURGERY 597, 597-98, 600-
602 (2000).
14. See generally General Principles, supra note 6 (covering the factors that
govern survival).
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States. An allocation system emphasizing urgency is less reasonable in
situations such as kidney transplantation, where dialysis has allowed
kidney transplant candidates to achieve long-term survival and severity
of renal impairment has little impact on survival. In general,
narrowing the range of wait list survival rates or increasing the range of
post-transplant survival rates might strengthen the argument for
increasing the relative weight of utility in the allocation process, but
the accuracy of one's predictive abilities needs to also be considered.
Initially, efficacy was measured in terms of crude post-transplant
survival rates, but the focus of efficacy has recently been shifting
towards better means of quantifying the additional survival time or
"transplant benefit" (often counted in terms of life-years-gained),
afforded by liver transplantation. This concept was first introduced in
the context of liver transplantation in the mid-1990s, when it was noted
that post-transplant survival rates of "electively transplanted" patients
were very good, but lower than their waitlist survival would have been
without transplantation. 16 These results led some to suggest that less
severely-ill candidates should receive priority over more critically-ill
candidates. 7 Doctors Robert A. Wolfe and Robert Merion have used
more recently-developed quantitative measures of medical urgency to
demonstrate that: (a) liver transplantation provides increasing "life
years gained" (i.e. survival benefit) for candidates with increasing
urgency; and (b) for candidates with stable liver disease, liver
transplantation is actually associated with a loss in survival time as
compared to remaining on the waiting list.'"
16. See Oscar Bronsther et al., Prioritization and Organ Distribution for Liver
Transplantation, 271 JAMA 140, 141 (1994); Bijan Eghtesad et al., Disease Gravity
and Urgency of Need as Guidelines for Liver Allocation, 20 HEPATOLOGY 56S,
58S-59S (1994).
17. See Mark F. Anderson, The Future of Organ Transplantation: From Where
Will New Donors Come, To Whom Will Their Organs Go?, 5 HEALTH MATRIX
249, 303-04 (1995).
18. See Kim M. Olthoff et al, Summary Report of a National Conference:
Evolving Concepts in Liver Allocation in the MELD and PELD Era, 10 LIVER
TRANSPLANTATION A6, A7-A10 (2004). See generally Robert M. Merion Robert
A. Wolfe, et al, The Survival Benefit of Liver Transplantation, 5 AM. J.
TRANSPLANTATION 307 (2005) (discussing transplant survival benefits for those
with pre-transplant risk).
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It is becoming increasingly apparent that to accurately evaluate the
true efficiency of liver transplantation, such "intent-to-treat" analyses,
which apply competing risk analyses, must be used instead of looking
at crude survival rates. 9  The use of "intent-to-treat" analyses is
conceptually appealing because it incorporates the concepts of
maximization of benefit and avoidance of harm-concepts not
incorporated by the use of post-transplant survival rates alone. The
use of crude survival rates also suggests that there is a trade-off
between equity and utility because of the inverse relationship between
disease severity and post-transplant survival.20  Discussion of the
optimal means of balancing this trade-off previously occupied much
discussion in the field." "Intent-to-treat" analyses largely dispel the
idea of such a tradeoff, as the transplant benefit of severely ill liver
transplant recipients is large in spite of a slightly lower crude survival
rate.22
Procedural Justice
Once the means by which the allocation of a scarce resource, i.e. the
distributive justice, has been agreed upon, methods or procedures must
be developed to ensure fair outcomes.23 Such methods may be referred
to as means of achieving procedural justice; developing means to
ensure procedural justice may itself be quite a challenge. Consider, for
19. Richard B. Freeman, Liver Allocation: the Intent-to-Treat Approach, 19
TRANSPLANT INT'L 270, 270 (2006) ("[W]hen examining organ allocation system,
either within center or across nations, their effects on patients must be analyzed
using an intent-to-treat approach") [hereinafter Freeman, Liver Allocation]. See
also W. Ray Kim et al, Deaths on the Liver Transplant Waiting List: An Analysis of
Competing Risks, 43 HEPATOLOGY 345, 346 (2006) (discussing death as "failure"
with respect towards competing risk analysis).
20. See Francis L. Delmonico et al, The High-Risk Liver Allograft Recipient,
127 ARCHIVES SURGERY 579, 584 (1992). See also Sammy Saab et al, MELD Score
Predicts 1-Year Patient Survival Post-Orthotopic Liver Transplantation, 9 LIVER
TRANSPLANTATION 473, 475-76 (2003).
21. See Burdick et al., supra note 4, at 2226 (discussing, in 1991, organ sharing
and concept of cost and benefit). See generally Daniel Wikler, Equity, Efficacy,
and the Point System for Transplant Recipient Selection, 21 TRANSPLANT PROC.
3437 (1989) (earlier article using equity and efficiency in choosing transplant
recipients).
22. See Freeman, Liver Allocation, supra note 11, at 272.
23. See generally John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (rev. ed., Harvard Univ.
Press 1999) (advocating the placement of policy makers behind a "veil of
ignorance," whereby they do not know how the policies they create will affect
them later).
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example, an employer who is deciding how to distribute monetary
awards amongst a group of sales department employees. Employees
would likely perceive the distribution of awards based on sales revenue
as having distributive justice, and as long as the employer had an
accurate means of tallying the sales revenues of each sales person,
procedural justice may be achieved. Many factors that affect sales
revenue are outside of the control of a salesperson, however, and a
decision to distribute the monetary awards based on degree of
motivation, rather than sales revenue, may therefore also be perceived
as distributive justice; however, there is no well-accepted objective
means of measuring motivation, and the procedural justice would be
much more difficult to attain in this latter allocation system.
Quantitative scales, also known as "point systems," are often used as
objective means to measure a certain quality. As pointed out by
medical ethicist, Professor Daniel Wikler, the point systems used in
organ allocation do not, by themselves, promote the distributive justice
of an allocation system: while a point system may be objective in its
measurement of a given quality, the choice of qualities to be measures
and incorporated into an allocation schema remains purely subjective.
24
Ad Hoc Donor Liver Allocation: 1968-1984
Progress in the field of liver transplantation made huge strides in the
two decades following the first procedurally successful liver transplant
at the University of Colorado in 1963. 2' Researchers and doctors
26
identified an effective "triple therapy" of immunosuppression drugs,
defined "brain death,, 27 and improved the technical aspects of the liver
transplant operation.2' The Consensus Development Conference of
24. See Wikler, supra note 21, at 3437.
25. The patient, unfortunately died several months later. Thomas E. Starzl et
al, Evolution of Liver Transplantation, 2 HEPATOLOGY 614, 614 (1982) [hereinafter
Starzl et al, Evolution].
26. Thomas E. Starzl, The Saga of Liver Replacement, with Particular
Reference to the Reciprocal Influence of Liver and Kidney Transplantation (1955-
1967), 195 J. AM. COLL. SURGERY 587, 601-02 (2002) [hereinafter Starzl, Saga].
27. See generally Ad Hoc Committee of Harvard Medical School to Examine
the Definition of Brain Death, A Definition of Irreversible Coma, 205 JAMA 85
(1968) (defining irreversible coma as a new criterion for death); President's
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical
Behavioral Research, Guidelines for the Determination of Death, 246 JAMA, 2184
(1981) (proposing a model statute intended to create nationwide uniformity
regarding the determination of death).
28. See generally Starzl, Saga, surpa note 26 (discussing such technical aspects).
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1983, initiated by Doctors. Thomas Starzl and Roy Calne, and
sponsored by the National Institutes of Health, the Health Care
Finance Administration, and the Veterans Administration, concluded
that liver transplantation was no longer experimental but rather "a
therapeutic modality for endstage liver disease that deserves broader
application."29  In spite of the progress, only five liver transplant
centers were active by 1984: the University of Pittsburgh, the
University of Minnesota, the University of Tennessee, the University
of California at Davis, and the Massachusetts General Hospital.30 With
so few active liver transplant centers, the responsibility of procuring
and allocating donor livers belonged solely to the transplant clinicians
and transplant coordinators at these centers and, without any formal
rules or system for allocation in place, was done in an ad hoc fashion.3
Transplant coordinators had heavy influence over the system; that the
process was described as "[a]d hoc case selection at odd hours, guided
by the often faulty memory of a transplant coordinator or by
incomplete tabular information .... ,,32 A toll-free phone number was
created to help clinicians treating potential organ donors contact
transplant coordinators and help improve donor recovery rates, but
,, 33procurement remained "decentralized and imperfect
Federal Legislation: 1984-1985
A Media Blitz
The advent of the drug cyclosporine increased one-year post-
transplant survival rates from twenty-four to twenty-nine percent to
greater than seventy percent.34  With these improved results, the
29. National Institutes of Health Consensus Development Conference,
National Institutes of Health Consensus Development Conference Statement: Liver
Transplantation -June 20-23, 1983, 4 HEPATOLOGY 107S, I1OS (1984).
30. Gina Kolata, Liver Transplants Endorsed, 221 Sci. 139, 139 (1983). See also
Phil Gunby, Media - Abetted Liver Transplants Raise Questions of 'Equity and
Decency,' 249 JAMA 1973, 1973 (1983).
31. Russell H. Wiesner, Patient Selection in an Era of Donor Liver Shortage:
Current US Policy, 2 NATURE CLINICAL PRAc. GASTROENTEROLOGY &
HEPATOLOGY 24, 24 (2005).
32. Thomas E. Starzl et al., A Multifactorial System for Equitable Selection of
Cadaver Kidney Recipients, 257 JAMA 3073, 3075 (1987).
33. John K. Iglehart, Transplantation: the Problem of Limited Resources, 309
NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 123, 126 (1983).
34. Starzl et al, Evolution, supra note 25, at 621. See also Thomas E. Starzl et
al, Liver Transplantation with the Use of Cyclosporin A and Prednisone, 305 NEw
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demand for liver transplantation increased and soon outgrew the
ability of the ad hoc allocation process to fairly and effectively procure
donor livers and match them to proper candidates. Compounding this
difficulty, health insurance plans did not cover the costs of the
procedure or the necessary immunosuppressive medications." Patients
and their families, desperate for resources to help with finding donor
livers and funding, turned to the government and to the "vagaries of a
[news] media blitz" for help.36
Perhaps the most widely-publicized candidate story was that of
Jamie Fiske. Born in 1981, Jamie developed biliary atresia and
remained on the waiting list the at University of Minnesota without
successfully obtaining a donor liver. 7 Jamie's father, Charlie, began
appealing for the directed donation of a pediatric liver, first through
Boston-area newspapers, then at a plenary session of the American
Academy of Pediatrics, and finally through the major national
television networks.38  Within days, the parents of a young trauma
victim in Utah directed the donation of their child's liver to Jamie, who
successfully underwent transplantation, in 1982, and was later
discharged home.39 Media attention toward liver transplantation
continued to build. Several other actors contributed to the media
attention on the plight of pediatric liver transplant candidates: Ashley
Bailey and Candi Thomas, two infant candidates (the latter the
daughter of a White House electrician) gained significant media
attention when President Ronald Reagan promised to fly to Pittsburgh
by helicopter or by Air Force One if a liver became available.4 0 The
media also highly publicized Brandon Hall, a candidate from
Tennessee whose mother asked Congress for help in finding a donor
liver.41 President Reagan appealed to the public for donor livers for
these "Reagan children" during two consecutive weekly radio
ENGLAND J. MED. 266, 267-68 (1981) [hereinafter Starzl, Cyclosporin]; Ry Calne &
Roger Williams, Orthotopic Liver Transplantation: the First 60 Patients, 1 BRIT.
MED. J. 471, 475 (1977).
35. See Iglehart, supra note 33, at 128.
36. Id. at 123.
37. Phil Gunby, supra note 30, at 1973 (1983).
38. See id. See also Richard A. Rettig, The Politics of Organ Transplantation:
A Parable of Our Time, 14 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y L. 191, 199 (1989).
39. See Gunby, surpa note 30, at 1973.
40. See Richard A. Rettig, The Politics of Organ Transplantation: A Parable of
Our Time, 14 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 191,204 (1989).
41. See id. at 199.
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addresses in July of 1983, and these pleas were credited with a notable
42increase in donation rates.
The National Organ Transplant Act (NO TA)
The media coverage illustrating the plight of candidates and their
families, increasing public attention toward liver transplantation, and
direct petitioning of legislators by their constituents increased the
government's interest in liver transplantation and eventually spurred
• 43
legislation governing many aspects of allocation. In spring of 1983,
Democratic House member Al Gore, chairman of the House Science
and Technology Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight,
initiated a Congressional inquiry into liver graft allocation and
governmental funding of liver transplantation.44 The first component
of these hearings was an organ procurement workshop convened by
Surgeon General C. Everett Koop at the request of President Ronald
Reagan and First Lady Nancy Reagan.
The House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Health and
Environment continued the inquiry into liver transplantation
procurement, allocation, and funding in the fall of 1983. Legislative
action came when Senator Edward Kennedy proposed a bill that called
for the establishment of a national organ procurement andS - 46
transplantation task force, to look in to the situation. Gore
subsequently introduced House Resolution 4080 in the House of
Representatives, which was the National Organ Transplant Act-47
proper. Sections of this House bill were then combined with sections
of the Kennedy's Senate bill, and reintroduced by Senator Orrin Hatch
as S.2048.4 ' The Senate passed this final version in April of 1984 and,
after bicameral meetings throughout the summer to negotiate further
revisions, the House passed the final version on October 3rd. The final
42. See THOMAS E. STARZL, THE PUZZLE PEOPLE: MEMOIRS OF A TRANSPLANT
SURGEON 272 (Univ. of Pittsburg Press 2003).
43. See Iglehart, supra note 33, at 123-24; Starzl,Cyclosporin, supra note 34, at
269-70; Robert Pear, Anecdotes and the Impact They've Had on Policy, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 27, 1983, at B6.
44. Iglehart, supra note 33, at 123, 124 ; Starzl, Cyclosporin, supra note 34, at
270; Howard S. Schwartz, Bioethical and Legal Considerations in Increasing the
Supply of Transplantable Organs: From UAGA to "Baby Fae," 10 AM. J. L. &
MED. 397, 410 (1985).
45. Iglehart, supra note 33, at 124, 126.
46. See S. 1728, 98th Cong. (1983).
47. See H.R. 4080, 98th Cong. (1983).
48. Compare S. 2048, 98th Cong. (1983) with S. 1728 and H.R. 4080.
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revision of the law: (1) provided funding for regional organ
procurement agencies; (2) required the Secretary of the Department of
Health and Human Services to establish, by contract, a national organ
procurement and transplantation network (OPTN) to facilitate the
procurement and distribution of donor organs; (3) mandated
Medicare/Medicaid funding of transplant procedures and medication;
(4) called for a task force to further study organ allocation; and (5)
prohibited the sale of donor organs. 9 On October 19, 1984 President
Reagan signed this revised bill, referred to as the National Organ
Transplant Act (NOTA; also referred to as the "Gore bill").5 °
The Legal Authority of NOTA
Unlike the ability to maintain armed forces, regulate international
and interstate commerce, coin money, or other powers enumerated in
the U.S. Constitution, the ability to regulate organ allocation is not
explicitly granted to Congress in the Constitution. Furthermore, any
powers not enumerated to the Congress are to remain with the states
or with individuals; 2 safeguarding public health and regulating the
practice of medicine are typically considered police powers of the
states, not of the federal government.53 Instead, Congress relied on its
powers to tax and spend-largely through the Medicare and Medicaid
allocations-to encourage compliance with its legislation.54 This is
perhaps the most common source of authority for Congress's
regulation of public health matters.5 NOTA in particular was given
"teeth" by the passage of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1986 that required all medical centers performing organ transplants to
participate in the OPTN or forfeit their eligibility of federal Medicare
and Medicaid payments.56 Although the voluntary nature of OPTN
49. See National Organ Transplant Act, Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98 Stat. 2339
(1984) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 273-274 (2000)).
50. See id.
52. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
53. See James G. Hodge, Jr., The Role of New Federalism and Public Health
Law, 12 J.L. & HEALTH 309, 318-23 (1998).
54. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-8 (2000).
55. See Wendy E. Parmet, Health Care and the Constitution: Public Health and
the Role of the State in the Framing Era, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 267, 277 & n.46
(1993).
56. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-507, §
1138 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320b-8 (West3002)).
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membership is sometimes emphasized,57 the prospect of losing federal
Medicare/Medicaid payments meant that, for all practical purposes,
federal legislation made membership in OPTN, and compliance with
HHS-approved OPTN policies, mandatory for U.S. transplant centers
that depend on these payments.59 A government-appointed task force
would later claim that the government had the moral authority to
participate in organ allocation because donor organs are not private or
market goods but rather a "national resource to be used for the public
good. 6 °
Another important feature of NOTA was its rulemaking provisions.
Congress typically issues mandates or objectives stated in broad
legislative language, then delegates the tasks of creating detailed rules,
enforcing the rules, and adjudicating conflicts to an administrative
agency. Congress itself does not directly supervise organ allocation.
Thus, NOTA delegates specific tasks in the establishment and
maintenance of the OPTN to two administrative agents or agencies:
(1) the secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS); and (2) a private non-profit entity that will maintain the OPTN
by contract.61
In the congressional debate that preceded NOTA, in NOTA itself,
and in Congressional reports that have followed passage of NOTA, it
is clear that Congress intended to keep the creation of specific organ
allocation procedures out of the hands of the federal government. A
Senate report first demonstrated the objectives in NOTA by stating
that the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources found
"sufficient cause to believe that the national coordinating effort, while
stimulated by the federal government and this legislation, should
nonetheless be located in the private sector rather than in
government., 62 NOTA states that with regards to organ allocation
57. See 42 U.S.C. 1320b-8(b)(1) (2000).
59. John A. Sten, Note, Rethinking the National Organ Transplant Program:
When Push Comes to Shove, 11 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 197, 216 n.172
(1994).
60. Task Force on Organ Transplantation, Dep't of Health & Human Serv.,
Organ Transplantation: Issues and Recommendations 86 (1986).
61. See Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, 42 C.F.R. pt. 121
(2006).
62. S. Rep. No. 98-382, at 15 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3975,
3981..
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"[t]he Secretary shall by contract provide for the establishment and
operation of an Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network...
.,.63 The House, in a report on legislation that would renew NOTA,
subsequently found that "Congress has consistently recognized that the
management and formulation of policies applicable to this field of
medicine is best left in the expert hands of the medical community, the
patients, and donor families who are most directly affected".6
4
Furthermore, NOTA required only that the OPTN use "medical
criteria" in organ allocation procedures; 61 otherwise, the OPTN may
determine the best policies for organ allocation.
Typically authority is delegated to an administrative agency that has
either (1) been created by statute (e.g., the Central Intelligence
Agency, the National Aeronautics and Space Agency) or that is part of
the Executive Branch (e.g., the Environmental Protection Agency, the
Department of Defense). NOTA is somewhat atypical - though not
66
unique - in that Congressional authority is instead delegated to a
private party. There has been some legal debate over whether
congressional authority can be delegated to a private party such as the
OPTN. Although not entirely settled, a large number of cases ranging
from Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States67 to Association of
American Physicians & Surgeons v. Weinberger68 show support for thedelegation of Congressional authority to private parties.
Refining Distributive Justice: 1986-1994
The purpose of NOTA is to facilitate and regulate organ allocation;
however, typical of many Congressional statutes, NOTA gave no
specific policies or procedures regarding the distribution of donor
organs. Instead, NOTA stipulated the creation of a task force to
suggest means by which the remainder of NOTA could be
implemented. Specifically, the task force was to consider the "medical,
legal, ethical, economic, and social issues presented by human organ
63. National Organ Transplant Act, § 372(a).
64. H.R. Rep. no. 106-429, at 9-10 (1999).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 274(b)(2)(B) (2000).
66. Other examples of private parties acting as contractors for the federal
government include the National Railroad Passenger Corporation ("Amtrak") and
the U.S. Olympic Committee.
67. See 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
68. 395 F. Supp. 125, 139-40 (N.D.JI., 1975), affd per curiam, 423 U.S. 975
(1975).
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procurement and transplantation . . . As a result, the Task Force
on Organ Procurement and Transplantation, a forty-member panel
lead by Dr. Olga Jonasson, was convened. This multidisciplinary
group met during an eighteen month period from 1984 to April of 1986
and produced several recommendations regarding how donor organs
should be procured and allocated.70 The Task Force did provide
recommendations that were more specific than those in the NOTA
legislation regarding how organs should be allocated:
The Task Force recommends that selection of patients both for
waiting lists and for allocation of organs be based on medical
criteria that are publicly stated and fairly applied ... [The Task
Force also recommends that the] criteria be developed by a
broadly representative group that will take into account both
need and probability of success. Selection of patients otherwise
medically Iqualified should be based on length of time on the
waiting list.
In addition, the Task Force recommended that private and public
health insurance programs cover the costs of heart and liver
transplants and immunosuppression medications (kidney transplants
were already covered by most insurance programs at the time).,
Finally, the Task Force also recommended that assessments of a
candidate's social worth should not be used in determining priority for
organ allocation.73
On October 1, 1986, the first HHS contract to operate the OPTN
was awarded to the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS).
UNOS was originally founded by Dr. David Hume and Dr. Bernard
Amos in 1969 as the South-Eastern Regional Organ Procurement
Program (SEROPP) and used an early computer to facilitate kidney
sharing among transplant centers on the east coast.74 SEROPP later
gave over its computer system to UNOS, and by the time UNOS was
awarded the first OPTN contact, it had grown to support kidney
69. National Organ Transplant Act, § 101(b)(1)(A).
70. Starzl, Cyclosporin, supra note 34, at 274-75. See also Robert Pear, Federal
Panel Urges U.S. Organ Network and Transplant Aid, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1986, at
Al.
71. Task Force on Organ Transplantation, supra note 50, at 9-10.
72. See id. at 9.
73. Id. at 10 ("Selection of patients for transplants not be subject to favoritism,
discrimination on the basis of race or sex, or ability to pay.").
74. See M. Christian Williams et al., The Organ Center of the United Network
for Organ Sharing and Twenty Years of Organ Sharing in the United States, 77
TRANSPLANTATION 641,641-42 (2004).
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sharing for much of the United States.75 UNOS remains a nonprofit
entity and has received an HHS contract (typically three years in
length) since the first contract was awarded in 1986.76
Once the first contract was awarded, UNOS had the task of
establishing a procedure for the allocation of organs by a deadline in
May of 1987; however, no consensus could be reached by the UNOS
organ distribution committee,77 To avoid defaulting on its contractual
obligations to HHS, UNOS adopted, verbatim, a pre-existing "point
system" for liver allocation.78  Medical urgency, as defined by
functional status, weighed heavily in the system. 79 ABO compatibility,
cytotoxic antibody cross match results, waiting time, distance of the
donor and the recipient were also incorporated into the point system.8°
Initially, donor livers were made available to the local candidate with
the highest point total. If there were no suitable local candidates, the
donor liver was offered to candidates within the same UNOS region,"
then to other candidates across the nation. In addition to this system,
the UNOS STAT allocation system allowed critically-ill patients with a
low likelihood of survival without transplantation to have first access
to all donor livers procured throughout the system.82 The UNOS
STAT category was removed from the allocation system on January 1,
1991, however, amongst allegations that certain medical centers abused
the ability to list candidates under UNOS STAT in order to gain
81further access to donor livers
Additional legislation passed during these early years further
modified and clarified NOTA. The 1988 Transplant Act Amendments
75. See id. at 642-43.
76. See id. at 640.
77. See Oscar Bronsther, Thomas E. Starzl et al., Letter to the Editor, In
Reply, 272 JAMA 849, 849 (1994).
78. This allocation schema had been created by Dr. Starzl and his colleagues; it
was adopted from his kidney allocation schema that was in use at the University of
Pittsburgh at the time. See id.
79. Thomas E. Starzl et al., Equitable Allocation of Extrarenal Organs: With
Special Reference to the Liver, 20 TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 131,132 tbl. 3 (1988).
80. See id. at 134-36.
81. The United States is divided into 11 UNOS regions. Oscar Bronsther et al.,
Prioritization and Organ Distribution for Liver Transplantation, 271 JAMA 140,
142 (1994).
82. Douglas J. Norman, Letter to the Editor, The Distribution of Organs for
Liver Transplantation, 272 JAMA 848, 848 (1994).
83. Bronsther et al., supra note 81, at 142-43.
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required that the HHS Secretary provide public notification of any
proposed policy changes and that the Secretary solicit public
comments before approval of any proposed policies84. In addition, the
1990 Transplant Act Amendments required organs to be distributed
"equitably among patients" '' and required an assessment of the
nation's allocation system to be performed by the Government
Accounting Office. 86  This assessment revealed that some organ
procurement organizations were using center lists rather than organ
procurement organization-wide lists to allocate organs; this practice,
which was recognized as a potential violation of NOTA, was reported
to the Secretary of HHS.87
Possible Shortcomings in Procedural Justice: 1995-1997
The introduction of tacrolimus and additional refinements in the
technique of liver transplantation further improved outcomes. With
improved success came improved demand for the procedure,
exacerbating the imbalance between donor liver supply and candidate
demand. The total number of U.S. liver transplant programs had
grown from fifty-eight in 1987 to 112 in 1993.8 Yet again, the media
brought significant attention to the donor liver allocation process when
the legendary baseball great Mickey Mantle became a transplant
recipient in June 1995. Although many news sources commented on
the conspicuous fact that Mantle received a donor liver within 48 hours
of being listed as a candidate (most patients wait for months), no frank
misconduct was ever alleged on the part of transplant clinicians at the
Baylor University Medical Center in Dallas, where the transplant was
performed. 89 Nonetheless, many suspected that the allocation process
was not entirely equitable and that Mantle's celebrity played a role in
his short wait. 9°
In November of 1996 UNOS proposed two policy changes: first,
using a new scale to better identify the candidates in most urgent need
84. See H.R. Rep. no. 106-429, at 13.
85. See id.
86. Id. at 39.
87. Putting Patients First: Resolving Allocation of Transplant Organs J. Hearing
Before the Subcomm. On Health and the Environment of the H. Comm. on
Commerce and the S. Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 105th Cong. 76
(1998) (statement of Sec. Shalala) [hereinafter Putting Patients First Hearing].
88. Norman, supra note 82, at 848.
89. See Judith Randal, Mantle's Transplant Raises Delicate Issues About Organ
Allocation, 88 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 484,484 (1996).
90. See Randal, supra note 89, at 484.
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of liver transplantation; and second, giving priority to candidates with
acute liver failure, in an attempt to increase emphasis on medical
urgency.9  Rather than using the tiered UNOS score originally
proposed by Dr. Starzl, the Child-Turcotte-Pugh (CTP) score was
adopted for use in ranking candidates.9a Hospitalization status was
combined with the CTP score to categorize patients as UNOS Status 1,
Status 2, or Status 3 (in order of decreasing urgency). The UNOS
Status was combined with ABO blood type and waiting time to rank
candidates for donor organs.94 One month after UNOS proposed these
changes, HHS held a three-day hearing to discuss these and other
issues relevant to donor liver allocation.9
CTP-based ranking of candidates had limitations, however. First,
the CTP score had not been validated as a predictor of mortality in
adult or pediatric liver transplant candidates prior to its use in liver
allocation. 96 Also, subjective components (viz. grading of ascites and
encephalopathy) introduced more variability into the assessment of
urgency than a completely objective scale.97 Moreover, waiting time
was found to have no significant correlation with waitlist mortality.98
Finally, because the ranking of candidates still depended on their
hospitalization status, it was susceptible to "unprofessional
manipulation "9 aimed at prioritizing center interests over candidate
interests, as demonstrated by the alleged practices at three Chicagohospitals.' °°
91. See Wiesner, supra note 31, at 24.
93. Wiesner, supra note 31, at 24-25.
94. Theresa L. Heitz & Eric F. Kayira, Note, Worth Its Weight in Gold: Organ
Transplantation and the New UNOS Policies for Allocation of Hearts and Livers,
30 J. HEALTH & Hosp. L. 195,197 (1997).
95. Gina Kolata, Acrimony at Hearing on Revising Rules for Liver Transplants,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1996, at A20.
96. Wiesner, supra note 31, at 25.
97. Id.
98. Richard B. Freeman & Erick B. Edwards, Liver Transplant Waiting Time
Does Not Correlate With Waiting List Mortality. Implications for Liver Allocation
Policy, 6 LIVER TRANSPLANTATION 543, 549 (2000) ("[W]e found virtually no
relation between waiting time and mortality for each medical urgency status,
indicating that time on the list is not associated with an increased or decreased risk
for death without a transplant.").
99. Heitz & Kayira, supra note 94, at 197.
100. Reuters News Service, National Briefing, Midwest, Illinois: Prosecutor's
Diagnosis Is Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2003, at A 18.
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The OPTN "Final Rule": 1998-1999
The statement now referred to as the OPTN "Final Rule" (or simply
the "Final Rule") is clearly the single most important development in
donor liver allocation policy in the past decade. It is also the most
contentious. A discussion of the development of and reaction to the
OPTN Final Rule are therefore critical to understanding the recent
discussions in donor liver allocation.
When the Congress delegates to an administrative agency the task of
filling in the details of a statute or a policy, the agency typically does so
through a process termed "rulemaking." The steps in rulemaking are
laid out in the Administrative Procedure Act.10 ' Most rulemaking is of
the "notice and comment" nature,'02 where notice is given through
publication in the Federal Register, and comments are submitted by
interested parties. This process can have several iterations, and when
the agency believes it has no further comments to consider, it publishes
its "final rule."10 3 Following this publication, the rule has the force of
law in the same manner as a statute.
Proposal, Debate, Study and Implementation
Several sources report that the HHS discussions that led to the Final
Rule were prompted by Jeffrey Romoff, President of the University of
Pittsburgh Medical Center.'04 According to these sources, University
of Pittsburgh Medical Center Jeffrey Romoff had expressed the
University's frustrations in donor liver allocation matters to David
Matter, president of Oxford Development Corporation. Mr. Matter
was a "classmate and friend" of President Bill Clinton at Georgetown
University and was able to speak to him in person about the issue of
organ allocation when Clinton visited Pittsburgh in 1996.05 Clinton
referred the issue to then-Secretary of HHS Donna E. Shalala.' °6 On
April 2, 1998, HHS issued the OPTN Final Rule.' 7 In essence, the
Final Rule asked OPTN to develop policies that included three
components: (1) minimal listing criteria for waitlist candidates; (2)
101. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 et seq. (2000).
102. See 5 U.S.C. § 564 (2000).
103. See 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2000).
104. Steve Twedt, Friend Faxes Clinton on Organ Dispute, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE, Nov. 14, 1996, at C9.
105. See id.
106. Id.
107. Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, 63 Fed. Reg. 16,296
(Apr. 2, 1998) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 121).
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priority given to medical urgency in ranking candidates; and (3) a
standardized and objective medical criteria for assessing medical
urgency.
The transplant community was vocal in its reaction to the Final Rule,
and many transplant physicians contacted Secretary Shalala and/or
their congressional representatives to voice concerns.' °9 The main
concern about the Final Rule is fear that compliance would require a
single national wait list."1 ° A national wait list would likely increase the
need for cross-country transportation of donor livers, prolonging
ischemia times and resulting in the wastage of donor livers, increased
retransplantation rates, fewer transplanted candidates and more
waitlist deaths. Another concern was that a "sickest first" policy
devoid of utility considerations might result in: (1) decreased survival
rates, (2) that small community, or rural, based transplant centers
would be forced to close, and (3) that there would be a net outflow of
donor livers from areas with high donor procurement rates, thus acting
as a disincentive to procurement."' Reaction to the Final Rule was not
uniformly critical, however, with the American Liver Foundation,
Transplant Recipients International Organization, and the National
Transplant Action Committee all supporting the Final Rule."2
In addition to the possible consequences of the policy, many
legislators and transplant clinicians were concerned with the
perception that HHS was assuming a policy-making role. As detailed
above, the original NOTA legislation and all revisions since have
delegated to the OPTN the task of developing allocation procedures
and required only that they be "based on medical criteria." The
Secretary of HHS was to establish the OPTN by contract but retained
oversight over the OPTN and his or her ability to approve OPTN
policies."13  NOTA, however, gave the Secretary no policy or
rulemaking authority. Secretary Shalala maintained that the Final
108. See id. at 16,296.
109. See Putting Patients First Hearing, supra note 87, at 65-66 (statement of
Rep. Rep. Thurman).
110. See id.
111. See FDCHeMedia, Inc., Putting Patients First. Resolving Allocation of
Transplant Organs J. Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Health and the
Environment of the H. Comm. on Commerce and the S. Comm. on Labor and
Human Resources, 105th Cong. (1998) (testimony of Patient Access to
Transplantation Coalition) (testimony not available in officially published report;
found in Lexis Nexis CIS).
112. 146 Cong. Rec. H1685 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 2000) (statement of Rep. Stark).
113. See 42 U.S.C. § 273 et seq. (2000).
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Rule represented performance goals and a request for the OPTN-
initiated policy changes; by itself, she claimed, the Final Rule did not
represent policy or an attempt to make policy." 4 Yet others claimed
that the Secretary's attempt to specify medical urgency as the main
priority for allocation and to limit her approval of policies that
conformed to the Final Rule constituted attempts at policy making."1
To clarify many of the questions raised by the Final Rule, Congress
held a Joint Hearing before the House of Representative's
Subcommittee on Health and Environment of the Committee on
Commerce and the Senate's Committee on Labor and Human
Resources were held on June 18, 1998. Chaired by Representative
Michael Bilirakis (R-FL), the Joint Hearings heard testimony from,
among others, Donna Shalala; Dr. Ronald Busuttil, then-president of
UCLA Medical Center; Dr. Clive Callendar of Howard University;
Lawrence Hunsicker, then-President of UNOS; and Dr. Jorge Reyes,
then-Director of Pediatric Transplantation Surgery at the University of
Pittsburgh Medical Center.'
16
Included in the Fiscal Year 1999 Omnibus Spending Bill was an
amendment that delayed the implementation of the Final Rule by one
year and mandated that the Institute of Medicine conduct an
independent investigation into the potential effects of the regulation. " 7
The Institute formed the Committee on Organ Procurement and
Transplantation Policy, and after several months of study published aS • 118
series of recommendations. Among them were recommendations to
create "organ allocation areas" encompassing regions of nine million
people, to use point systems based on medical criteria and not waiting
times for candidates classified as Status 2B or Status 3, and for HHS to
take more authority over the allocation process." 9 After several more
114. See Putting Patients First Hearing, supra note 87, at 76.
115. See Putting Patients First Hearing, supra note 87, at 233 (statement of Mr.
Nathan, Director, Delaware Valley Transplant Program).
116. See Putting Patients First Hearing, supra note 87, at I-Il, 1.
117. Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act
of 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 213, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-359 (1998).
118. Comm. on Organ Procurement and Transplantation Pol'y, Div. of Health
Sci. Pol'y, Inst. of Med., Organ Procurement and Transplantation: Assessing
Current Policies and the Potential Impact of the DHHS Final Rule 5 (National
Academy Press 1999).
119. See id. at 6. 10. 14.
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delays, the OPTN Final Rule was implemented within a year of the
. • 120
Institute of Medicine study reflecting the Institute's advice.
Counterattacks to the Final Rule
In addition to the letter-writing campaign and the testimony
provided by the community of transplant clinicians, counterattacks
designed to thwart implementation of the Final Rule came swiftly and
in many forms. Individual transplant centers hired Washington
lobbyists to represent their views. 21  Wisconsin governor Tommy
Thompson and the Attorney General of Louisiana turned towards
legal action in their respective U.S. District Courts, both alleging that
Secretary Shalala exceeded her authority in issuing the Final Rule.122
Additionally, at least one transplant surgeon was allegedly
"blackballed from administrative positions" in the scientific
community because of his views on allocation.1
21
A legislative response to the Final Rule came in the form of a bill,
the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network Amendments of
2000.14 The objective of the bill was to require that transplant center-
specific data be made publicly-available, to create incentives for organ
donation, and to "ensure[] that decision making with regard to organ
transplantation remains, as originally intended under [NOTA], in the
transplant community".12' An amendment added to the bill during the
floor debate specifically nullified the Final Rule.'26 HR-2418 passed the
120. See Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, 64 Fed. Reg.
56,650, 56,650 (Oct. 20, 1999).
121. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Patients' Lives on the Line in Battle Over Transplants,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1998 at Al.
122. See Wisconsin Governor Challenges Federal Organ Transplant Rules, CNN,
Mar. 15, 2000, http:/archives.cnn.com/2000/HEALTH/03/15/transplant.fight. See
also Sunny Kaplan, New Federal Organ Transplant Policy Runs Into Resistance,
April 26, 1999, http://www.stateline.org/live/printable/story?contentd=13668 (last
visited April 9, 2007). See also Ronald W. Gimbel, Tension in the HHS
Contracting Regime: A Matter of Life and Death 18-19, 28 (Rockefeller Col. Rev.
Working Paper Series, Paper No. 01-104-01, 2001), available at
www.albany.edu/rockefeller/ rockreview/issuel/0110101.pdf.
123. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Patients' Lives on the Line in Battle over Transplants,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1998, at Al.
124. See H.R. 2418, 106th Cong. (2000).
125. H.R. Rep. No. 106-429, at 9.
126. See 146 Cong. Rec. H1685 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 2000) (statement of Rep.
Stark).
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House by a 275-147 vote on April 4h, 2000.127 Unfortunately, the
128Senate never took action on the bill.
Other legislative responses to the Final Rule have come at the state
level, prohibiting the exportation of donor organs outside the state
unless no suitable candidate can be found within the state. 2 9 States
such as Arizona, Florida, Louisiana, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas,
and Wisconsin have passed such laws.130 The legality of these laws has
been questioned.' Regardless, such state prohibitions may be
counterproductive to the goal of broader organ sharing in an attempt
to minimize geographic discrepancies in access to liver transplantation
Case Law and NOTA
Case law involving NOTA has been scant. In one case from the
Fifth Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals, a defendant was found not
to be a federal actor merely because of membership in UNOS.3 2 In
Wheat v. Mass, Margaret Gordon, a patient with severe liver
dysfunction was transferred to Ochsner Hospital in New Orleans to be
evaluated for a liver transplantation. There it was determined that she
did indeed require transplantation, but because her medical insurance
did not cover transplantation, Gordon was told she must raise a
$175,000 down payment.'33 Gordon was later placed on the national
transplant waiting list but died before an organ match was found. 34
The appellants sued Mass, a physician at the hospital treating Gordon,
and several other parties alleging a number of causes of action.'35 One
of these causes required establishing that Mass' hospital was a federal
127. 146 Cong. Re. H1722 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 2000) (roll call vote no. 101).
128. See Search Results - THOMAS (Library of Congress), http://
thomas.loc.gov/ cgi-bin/ bdquery/ z?d106:HR02418:@@@X (last visited Apr. 17,
2007) (legislative tracking showing H.R. 2418 was never reported out of its Senate
committee).
129. Roderick T. Chen, Note, Organ Allocation and the States: Can the States
Restrict Broader Organ Sharing?, 49 DUKE L.J. 261, 261, 263 (1999).
130. Id. at 263.
131. See generally id. (questioning the constitutionality of these state laws under
the Commerce Clause).
132. See Wheat v. Mass, 994 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1993).
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government actor. 136 The appellants argued that the hospital was such
an actor by virtue of its membership in the United Network for Organ
Sharing (UNOS). 37 Citing case law, the Fifth Circuit ultimately found
that receiving federal funds by virtue of its participation in UNOS did
not make the hospital a federal actor.
38
In a second case, UNOS was resisting a subpoena issued by the
Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human Services.
In U.S. v. United Network for Organ Sharing, the Inspector General of
HHS issued a subpoena to UNOS pursuant to a joint investigation by
the Office of Inspector General, the United States Attorney's Office
and the Illinois Attorney General "concerning the possible submission
to the Medicare and Medicaid programs of false claims for payment by
three UNOS member hospitals, including whether such false claims
affected the mandated equitable distribution of livers available for
transplant."'39  UNOS, did not want to disclose such information,
claiming that having it revealed would impact the integrity of the peer
review process involved in the donor program. The IG then sought a
subpoena from the district court for these materials.'4'
After discussing the scope of discovery in federal cases, the court
noted that here it was "asked to enforce an administrative subpoena
where the court's role is limited because of the important
governmental interest in the expeditious investigation of possible
unlawful activity.' ' 42 In order to properly weigh the interests involved,
the district court used the test set forth in United States v. Morton Salt
Co. which states that:
[L]aw-enforcing agencies have a legitimate right to [sa]tisfy [sic]
themselves that corporate behavior is consistent with the law and
the public interest ... [I]t is sufficient if the inquiry is within the
authority of the agency, the demand is not too indefinite and the
information sought is reasonably relevant.1
44
136. Namely, a § 1983 action and a claim under the Fifth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution, both of which required Mass' hospital to be a "state actor" in
order to have a viable cause of action. See id. at 275-76.
137. Id. at 276.
138. See Wheat, 994 F.2d at 276.
139. No. 02 C 2295, 2002 WL 1726536, at *1 (N.D. Ill. May 17, 2002).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at *2.
144. Id. (quoting United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632,652 (1950)).
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Finding such prerequisites, the court then granted the government's
petition to have the subpoenas enforced.
145
These two cases cited are the only ones yet to arise from NOTA, but
this is a very specific topic of case law, so some analysis is helpful
accepting that declaring a trend based on such a small number must
be done with prudence. Litigation can be analyzed by looking at what
resources are at stake, who is a stakeholder, and how are decisions
made in allocating these stakes or resources. NOTA has created a
system that changes the way organs are allocated and it changes the
way several stakeholders relate to one another.
To forecast trends in NOTA case law, one might first list the kinds
of stakeholders affected by NOTA. Largely, these would include
recipients of organs, donors of organs, physicians engaged in
transplanting organs, UNOS and its members, and HHS. Litigation
will arise under NOTA because the supply of organs is far smaller than
the need (demand) for these organs and because organs and patients
are not fungible. Both of these imbalances require judgment.
Dissatisfaction with the outcome of a judgment or the process leading
to making of that judgment may, therefore, be followed by litigation.
The Final Rule was attacked in U.S. District Courts by the Governor
of Wisconsin and the Attorney General of Louisiana alleging that the
Secretary of HHS had exceeded her authority. 46 No case law came
from this lawsuit, yet future rule-making by HHS will probably create
dissatisfaction among some stakeholders and giving rise to legal
challenges.
Although NOTA was enacted to reduce disparities and increase
exchange among sources of donors and recipients, most certainly there
will be challenges as occurred in Wheat will continue Plaintiffs will
allege that improper and impermissible factors were used in deciding
who is to get a liver transplant. Wheat provides a short but wide-
ranging checklist of several US Constitutional and statutory issues that
can be expected.
Medical procedures cost money. In the case of organ transplants, a
lot of money can be involved. Some of this money will come from the
federal government. The federal government has a duty to assure the
public that federal funds are used correctly, and it does so through
audits. U.S. v United Network for Organ Sharing suggest the possibly
of a series of cases dealing with such issues as financial audits and the
integrity of the peer review process.
145. Id. at *1.
146. See Gimbel, supra note.122 and accompanying text.
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As with most activities involving human decisions and actions, the
possibility of litigation grows with increasing numbers of decisions and
actions. For now, though, it seems that the purpose of NOTA is being
fulfilled with nominal litigation.
Complying with the Final Rule: 2000-Present
In response to the Final Rule's goal of creating rankings with
"sufficient number of categories . . . to avoid grouping together
patients with substantially different medical urgency,1 47  a
subcommittee of the Liver and Intestine Committee of UNOS was
formed to identify an improved means of measuring medical148
urgency. 8 After a review of existing prognostic models, the Mayo
End-Stage Liver Disease model, later modified and renamed the
Model for End Stage Liver Disease (MELD) was chosen for closer
examination because it relied exclusively on objective, easily-obtained
clinical parameters. 149 After validation using independent samples of
patients with end-stage liver disease, MELD was found to be more
accurate in predicting short-term mortality risk than the CTP score.
MELD scoring replaced CTP scoring and waiting time as the means of
ranking adults on the waiting list on February 2 6 1h, 2002; however,
allocation still proceeded on a three-tiered system, proceeding from
local candidates to regional candidates, then national candidates.15 An
evaluation of donor liver allocation since the introduction of MELD
147. 42 C.F.R. § 121.8(b)(2).
148. Russell H. Wiesner et al., MELD and PELD: Application of Survival
Models to Liver Allocation, 7 LIVER TRANSPLANTATION 567, 567 (2001)
[hereinafter Wiesner et al., MELD and PELD].
149. See Michael Malinchoc et al., A Model to Predict Poor Survival in Patients
Undergoing Transjugular Intrahepatic Portosystemic Shunts, 31 HEPATOLOGY 864
(2000); Wiesner et al., MELD and PELD, supra note 148, at 570-74.
150. Patrick S. Kamath et al., A Model to Predict Survival in Patients With End-
Stage Liver Disease, 33 HEPATOLOGY 464, 469 (2001) ("In summary, MELD is a
reliable measure of short-term mortality risk in patients with end-stage liver
disease of diverse etiology and severity."); Wiesner et al., MELD and PELD,
supra note 148, at 570-71, 578 ("Compared to the CTP score.., the MELD and
PELD models provide the means more accurately measure liver disease severity
and to better predict which patients are at risk of dying on the waiting list." Id. at
578).
151. See Richard B. Freeman Jr. et al., Improving Liver Allocation: MELD and
PELD, 4 AM. J. OF TRANSPLANTATION 114, 114, 126 (2004).
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scoring has demonstrated that a smaller percentage of candidates have
been removed from the waitlist because of death.15
Despite an improved ability to rank patients based on medical
urgency, geographic inequalities in terms of access to liver
transplantation still exist."3 Reports from two regions suggest that
broader sharing, at least for the severely ill Status 1 candidates,
contributes to decreased waitlist mortality. 15 4 In contrast, a computer
simulation using an alternative, the UNOS Liver Allocation Model,
suggested that broader sharing of donor livers would not significantly
impact the annual number of waitlist deaths, post-transplant deaths, or
retransplants."' More recently, the donor liver allocation schema has
been changed to distribute a donor liver to local, regional, and national
candidates with MELD scores of 15 and above before offering the liver
to local, regional or national candidates with MELD scores below 1 5156
It remains to be seen if this policy change will minimize geographic
inequalities in access to liver transplantation.
CONCLUSIONS: LESSONS LEARNED
Good healthcare policy is continually evolving in order to minimize
to perceived problems and work towards stated goals. While this
152. See id. at 126-27.
153. See generally James F. Trotter & Michael J. Osgood, MELD Scores of
Liver Transplant Recipients According to Size of Waiting List, Impact of Organ
Allocation and patient Outcomes, 291 JAMA, 1871 (2004) (how there is disparity in
MELD scores between small and large organ procurement organizations
throughout the United States); Randolph L. Schaffer et al., The Sickest First?
Disparities with Model for End-Stage Liver Disease-Based Organ Allocation: One
Region's Experience, 9 Liver Transplantation 1211 (2003) (showing disparity
within one UNOS region).
154. See Abhinav Humar et al., Regionwide Sharing for Status I Liver Patients-
Beneficial Impact on Waiting Time and Pre- and Posttransplant Survival, 10 Liver
Transplantation 661, 664 ("Nevertheless, despite the biases, there does seem to be
a benefit to regional sharing for Status 1 patients."). See also Kenneth Washburn
et al., Regional Sharing for Adult Status 1 Candidates: Reduction in Waitlist
Mortality 12 Liver Transplantation 470 (2006) (concluding that "regional sharing
for status 1 candidates results in an increased transplant rate and a reduction in
waitlist mortality." Id. at 470).
155. See Richard B. Freeman, et al., Redrawing Organ Distribution Boundaries:
Results of a Computer-Simulated Analysis for Liver Transplantation 8 Liver
Transplantation 659 (2002) ("The ULAM predicts that changing liver distribution
units to larger geographic areas has little positive impact on overall results of liver
transplantation in the United States compared with the current plan." Id. at 659).
156. See Freeman Jr. et al., supra note 155, at 116-21.
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evolution was initially left to transplant clinicians and academicians,
the past has shown that the federal and state governments as well as
administrative agencies will likely continue to have some role in
creating allocation policies. Yet the question remains as to what
manner and to what extent should transplant clinicians be involved
with these legal actors in the allocation process?
As is evident from the plethora of medical journals cited herein,
clinician input is critical to the creation of health policy, as medical
expertise is necessary to create specific policies and their
implementation. No politician, policy analyst, or lay person will be
more familiar with the details of donor organ allocation than the
clinicians that are involved in organ allocation on a daily basis. That
being said, it should be recognized that the policy-making process,
largely political in nature, is qualitatively different from the clinical
decision-making process, which is largely based on science. Policy
decisions involve tradeoffs and a balancing of interests. While some
possible decisions may be inequitable, a solution that will be perceived
as best for all stakeholders involved is oftentimes unavailable. As
stated by Doctor Douglas Norman, "Until we have enough organs for
every waiting patient, any organ allocation policy will seem unfair to
someone. All national organ allocation policies involve difficult and
controversial decisions."'57  Doctor R. Randall Bollinger, a former
UNOS president, also expressed this concept when he wrote that "[i]t
is clear that no single correct solution exists for liver allocation. A
balance of competing objectives and results may be the best available
solution."'58 While, the input of transplant clinicians is vital, the input
of legislators, policy makers, transplant candidates, and the general
public is also important and should also be considered.
Similar to weighing the relative merits of quality and quantity, a
discussion of the relative value of utility versus equity is nothing more
than an academic endeavor, unless it is grounded in a specific context.
The particular details of a given situation must guide policy efforts, and
in this respect a donor liver allocation policy is no different.
Qualitative results from one survey of adult liver transplant candidates
suggests that lay individuals-i.e. those without medical, statistical, or
157. Norman, supra note 82, at 848 (emphasis in original).
158. Bollinger RR, A UNOS perspective on donor liver allocation. United
Network for Organ Sharing. LIVER TRANSPL. SURG. 1995; 1:47-55.
at 52.
160. See Neal R. Barshes et al., Adult Liver Transplant Candidate Attitudes
Toward Graft Sharing Are Not Obstacles to Split Liver Transplantation, 5 AM. J.
TRANSPLANTATION 2047 (2005).
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ethical training-can appreciate how the "numbers" might alter the
balance between equity and utility.'60 Yet, speaking from personal
experience, it is the transplant clinician who can best understand
ethical or policy dilemmas in the context of contemporary liver
transplantation. In addition, transplant clinicians and clinical
researchers possess the expertise needed to properly evaluate the
procedural justice of a system. When all the parties involved in the
policy-making process have reached consensus on what characteristics
or values should be considered and how they should be weighed in the
ranking of liver transplant candidates, the task of developing objective
and unbiased measures of these characteristics would be best
performed by transplant clinicians. Peer-reviewed research, an
integral part of contemporary medicine, is an effective means of
identifying and developing such measures. Once identified, the
transplant clinician community can also be relied upon to effectively
implement the use of these measures. The development, validation
implementation and frequent re-evaluation of the MELD scoring
system provides a good example of how effectively this role can be
performed by the transplant clinician community ' .
Limits to physician involvement in health policy exist, however. The
input of physicians in policy matters is generally perceived by the
public as having significant authority, as the input is typically based on
science and therefore unbiased by power interests. This authority is
weakened, however, when physicians are viewed as stakeholders more
concerned with material interests than equitable patient care. 162 As
pointed out in a recent editorial, advocacy for a transplant center can
often be mistakenly perceived (or disguised) as advocacy for
patients. 6 3 Likewise UNOS has a dual role: that of being a contractor
to the HHS as well as an interest group for transplant clinicians,
161. See, e.g., Kim M. Olthoff et al., Summary Report of a National Conference:
Evolving concepts in Liver Allocation in the MELD and PELD Era, 10 LIVER
TRANSPLANTATION A6 (2003) (discussing the results of a national conference on
MELD).
162. See Gimbel, surpa note 122, at 18, 24-25.
163. Richard B. Freeman, Jr., Editorial, Mortality Risk, Behavior, and Pediatric
Liver Allocation, 12 LIVER TRANSPLANTATION 12, 12 (2006) ("[B]ehavior, the
compassionate desire to alleviate a child's disease (or worse, programmatic self-
preservation disguised as compassion) drives physicians to utilize the system in
favor of their own patients.").
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transplant centers, and organ procurement organizations. Such a role
entails an evaluation of competing interests that may sometimes impair
its own performance as a whole.'6 Additionally, policymaking is
generally considered a task of elected officials, and the participation of
scientists and physicians has been criticized as sometimes being too
intrusive. 
165
While practicing clinicians should factor in creating health policy for
specific populations, it can be argued that the predominant role of
most physicians is in maximizing the health of individual patients.
Withholding a donor organ from a suitable candidate for
transplantation for the sake of rationing organs might thus represent a
conflict of interest. The act of rationing or distributing scarce
healthcare resources is clearly important, but it has been noted 166 that
this act would ideally be divorced from the role of providing care by
being carried out by separate individuals, minimizing the potential
conflict of interest. Although this concept is theoretically appealing,
others have noted that it is nearly impossible to divorce the practice of
medicine from rationing . . s68
Finally, transplant clinicians and legislators should consider two
additional ideas in light of the development of the current liver
allocation policies. First, legislation is typically passed in response to
perceived problems or disparities. Legislative efforts that led to
NOTA were stimulated at least in part by the absence of a formal
procedure to distribute donor organs and the resulting problems.
164. See Gimbel, surpa note 122, at 19-20.
165. See SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISERS AS
POLICYMAKERS 178-79 (Harvard Univ. Press 1990) (in discussing FDA
deliberations, it is noted that "[p]urists might object that the blending of science
and policy in advisory proceedings cedes too much political control to the experts,
undermining the agency's accountability." Id. at 178.).
166. See MARK A. HALL, MAKING MEDICAL SPENDING DECISIONS: THE LAW,
ETHICS, AND ECONOMICS OF RATIONING MECHANISMS 114-15, 118 (Oxford Univ.
Press 1997).
167. Bollinger, supra note 158, at 54 ("Problems have arisen when the same
person who is doing the best for his or her patients(s) is also making decisions on
the allocation of scarce resource . . . Physicians must be able to step back from
their roles as advocates for individual patients and look critically at allocation
issues apart from their own patients and centers.").
168. Robert D. Truog et al., Rationing in the Intensive Care Unit, 34 CRITICAL
CARE MED. J. 958, 959 (2006) ("Although agreeing that many types of rationing
should be done through public policy and regulatory structures, we believe that no
bright line can be drawn that will protect the bedside clinician from the need to
make rationing decisions.").
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During the 1998 Congressional hearings on the Final Rule, HHS
Secretary Donna Shalala intimated that the Final Rule was issued
because the transplant community had failed to address inequities in
the allocation system that had been identified several years earlier.'
69
Transplant clinicians may therefore limit further legislative or
administrative involvement in the liver allocation process by
preemptively acting to correct any perceived problems with allocation
policies. It would therefore be worthwhile for those involved in the
issue in the legal community to recognize and allow such action by the
medical community.
Second, the news media publicity generated by the "Reagan
children" of 1984 and by Mickey Mantle's liver transplant in 1995
clearly demonstrate that anecdotes can significantly impact public
policy and legislative processes.'70 While descriptive statistics, clinical
trials and mathematical models have much more credibility with those
in the scientific and medical communities, anecdotes can illustrate the
real-life effects of health policy or medical practices on individuals.
Furthermore, anecdotes are a common vehicle used by news media
sources to explain problems; they are often compelling and require
little formal training to understand. At the Congressional hearings
convened to discuss the Final Rule, the testimony of transplant
physicians opposed to the Rule contained notably few anecdotes.'' In
contrast, many of the non-physicians in favor of the Rule provided
testimony that featured or consisted almost entirely of anecdotes.1
72
Transplant clinicians and professional organizations may therefore
want to consider the use of anecdotes to better illustrate or explain
allocation-related problems to the general public, federal legislators
and administrative agencies.
In conclusion, the system of donor liver allocation in the U.S. is a
constantly evolving health policy. Organ allocation is guided by an
ethical foundation, of which equity (need) and utility (likelihood of
169. See Putting Patients First Hearing, supra note 87, at 76 (statement of Sec.
Shalala).
170. See Pear, Anecdotes and the Impact They've Had on Policy, supra note 43,
at B6.
171. Putting Patients First Hearings, supra note 87, at 135-45, 194-97, 211-15,
220-23 (statements of Dr. Hunsicker, President, UNOS; Mr. Busutil, Chief,
Division of Liver and Pancreas Transplantation, UCLA School of Medicine; Dr.
Ramos, Director, Liver Transplantation, Lifelink Transplantation Institute; Dr.
Reese, Surgeon, University of Vermont respectively).
172. See id. at 56, 57-58 (statements of Sen. Torricelli & Sen. Kerrey
respectively).
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benefit) are the most important considerations. Legislation has also
had an increasingly important role in the organ allocation process.
Federal legislation prior to 1998 allowed the transplant community to
determine the best balance of equity and utility, but more recent
legislation has given more weight to urgency in ranking candidates and
has wrested some of the decision-making from clinicians. Indeed,
decisions regarding the distributive justice of donor liver allocation
schemas are not exclusively medical, and thus should include input
from transplant candidates, politicians, policy makers, general public
and transplant clinicians alike. Future challenges include developing
policies that minimize geographic disparities in access to liver
transplantation and reconciling state limitations on organ sharing with
federal legislation and policy goals. Appreciation of both the ethical
and legislative foundation for allocation policies would improve the
ability of physicians to participate with legislative actors in the creation
of such policies. In the end, donor liver allocation is not exclusively
medical, ethical, or political in nature, but rather a combination of all
three.
